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Redeveloping Derelict and Underused Historic City Areas: Evidence from a
Survey of Real Estate Developers
Summary
Infill redevelopment—the transformation of previously used urban sites—is generally
regarded as an important way to attain environmental and urban sustainability goals. At many
locales, however, such urban renewal, community development, and tax revenue goals must
be reconciled with historic preservation objectives. Are economic incentives and regulatory
relief useful tools for encouraging reuse of abandoned or underutilized urban sites with
historic buildings? Answering this question is of key importance for many European cities
and for older US cities, and has important implications in terms of urban sustainability and
“smart growth” initiatives. We use conjoint choice experiments to explore the relative
importance of economic incentives, regulatory relief, land use and property regime offerings
at underutilized historical sites in Venice, Italy. We survey real estate developers and
investors, and ask them to choose between pairs of hypothetical projects in three Venice
locations, as well as between one of these projects and the alternative to do a development
project elsewhere. Statistical models of the responses to these choice questions indicate that
respondents are sensitive to the price of acquiring the land (and hence to any policies that
influence prices), and especially sensitive to the property regime that would be granted to
developers and investors and to the allowable land use. Contrary to expectations, our
respondents were insensitive to tightening or relaxing the stringency of building conservation
restrictions. Our findings sound a common theme with Howland (2004), who warns that
redevelopment of previously used sites in Baltimore is impaired by obsolete land uses, zoning
and infrastructure (but not by suspected or actual contamination). We conclude that the City
should focus on offering land uses and property regimes that are more in tune with developer
demand.
Keywords: Conjoint Choice Experiments, Real Estate Developers, Building Conservation
Restrictions, Redevelopment Incentives, Brownfields, Infill Redevelopment
JEL Classification: Z1, R52
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1. Introduction and Motivation
Local and national governments have traditionally used zoning and land use
restrictions, as well as regulation and economic incentives, to influence and shape cities,
neighborhoods within cities, and local economic activities. Infill redevelopment—the
transformation of previously used urban sites—is generally regarded as an important way
to attain environmental and urban sustainability goals, and a key component of “Smart
Growth” initiatives. At many locales, however, such urban renewal, community
development, and tax revenue goals must be reconciled with historic preservation
objectives (ICMA, 2003; Noonan, 2006).
A number of economic incentives, regulatory and liability relief tools are currently
available or under consideration at many locales to encourage urban infill redevelopment
(see Bartik, 2004). De Sousa (2000), Alberini et al., (2005), and Wernstedt et al. (2006),
have studied the desirability of policies targeted at idle and contaminated properties by
directly interviewing developers and other potentially affected parties.
Are the same or similar incentives useful when the abandoned or underutilized
urban infill sites are properties of historical, artistic or architectural interest? In this paper,
we attempt to answer this question focusing on a specific city (Venice, Italy) where such
sites are in abundant supply, and on the economic agents most directly involved in
redevelopment decisions (real estate developers and investors). We use survey-based
stated-preference methods.
Earlier literature has assessed the attractiveness of economic inducements to
developers by observing the occurrence of actual redevelopment projects and land use
changes as economic incentives are established (or repealed) over time or by exploiting
their variation over a relatively broad geographical area or jurisdiction (Bartik, 2004).
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These studies have used regression analyses and controlled for other characteristics of
properties or policies thought to influence redevelopment.
Unfortunately, these analyses are not possible with buildings with historical and
cultural value in Venice due to (1) the lack of transactions (these buildings or complexes
are owned by the local or national government, and are currently sitting idle), (2) the lack
of policy variation over space and time, and (3) the very small study area. Moreover, if
even transactions did occur, (4) there is a pervasive price misreporting problem.1 We
circumvent these problems by using stated-preference methods and asking people what
they would do under well-specified hypothetical circumstances.
In our questionnaire we query real estate developers about the factors that they
find attractive (or unattractive) in a place like Venice, and on the policy offerings that
could be devised to attract real estate development projects and investments in the city.
We ask a series of direct questions to investigate the former issue, and deploy a statedpreference approach to answer the latter.
The stated-preference questions in our survey instrument are conjoint choice
experiments that ask respondents to focus attention on three abandoned or underused
areas in the city of Venice—namely, (i) the Santa Marta Waterfront, and (ii) Arsenale
Darsena Grande, the central portion of the Arsenale, the ancient shipbuilding yard, and
(iii) Arsenale Bacini, the easternmost part of the Arsenale. Of these three areas, the one
with the highest historic value, and the one that is currently subject to the most restrictive
conservation requirements, is (ii). All of the three areas are currently owned by the local
or the national government, and an important decision to be made is whether they can be
sold, or merely leased, to private parties.

1

Property taxes are calculated using a different approach than in the U.S. This different approach has
encouraged buyers and sellers to underreport the sale price.
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We propose hypothetical development projects described by a total of 7 attributes:
(i) location (one of the three abovementioned locations), (ii) allowable use (commercial
or light industrial with an emphasis on artisanal production activities); (iii) access (current
or improved by rapid transit systems); (iv) presence or absence of conservation
restrictions; (v) property regime (lease or full property), and (vi) cost per square meter,
which includes the cost of the purchase or lease and development costs, and ranges from
€400 to 4000.
One advantage of this approach is that it lets us examine behaviours under
circumstances that have not been observed in real life before. Another is that, since
attributes are varied independently and simultaneously, it lets us disentangle the separate
effects of policies that are often bundled together in real life. For example, historic
building or district designations at many locales imply both tax credits or other subsidies
(which reduce the net price of the land or building) and restrictions on renovations and
use of the building.
We find that, contrary to what is often stated in policy circles, conservation
restrictions are not a deterrent to development projects at the three Venice locations here
studied. What truly matters to developers is the property regime and the allowed land use.
Specifically, they dislike leases and strongly prefer full property; they also dislike being
limited to light industrial uses—a type of land use that is strongly favoured by city
officials, on the grounds that it protects traditional handcrafting and small businesses—
and strongly prefer commercial uses. Although our respondents are not sensitive to an
explicit “improved transportation and access” attributes, it is clear that the most remote
Venice locale studied here is relatively unattractive, and that the Venice area that is
judged as most attractive is the only one with full car, truck and rail access.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2008

5

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 219 [2008]

5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
background information about the study areas. Section 3 discusses our research questions
and reviews the literature. Section 4 describes the conjoint choice approach, its
application to the three underutilized areas of Venice studied here, and the econometric
models of the responses to the choice questions. Section 5 describes the questionnaire and
the survey administration. Section 6 describes the data and section 7 the results of the
econometric model of the responses to the choice questions. We offer concluding remarks
in section 8.

2. Background
This study focuses on three areas in the city of Venice: The Waterfront in the S.
Marta neighborhood, the historic portion of the Arsenale, and the northeast portion of the
Arsenale (Arsenale Bacini).

We chose these areas for four reasons: (i) they are

comparatively large, (ii) they are unique, (iii) they are in very different locations, and (iv)
they are faced with varying degrees of conservation restrictions on buildings and
structures. Specifically, the most stringent requirements apply at the historic Arsenale,
while the other two locales are subject to very modest or no requirements at all.
The Venice Arsenale—the ancient shipbuilding yard of the Republic of Venice—
was founded in the 1100s, accounts for about 15% of the area of the city of Venice, and is
currently owned by the Italian government. In the second half of the 1500s, dockyard
organization was restructured to attain both horizontal and vertical integration (Clark and
Pinder, 1999). The Arsenale started to decline after World War I, and continued to
decline at an even faster rate after World War II, when its buildings were progressively
abandoned. In 1983 the Soprintendenza per i Beni Ambientali ed Architettonici of Venice
started a series of conservation works. One important feature of the Arsenale is that it is
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one of the few sites in Venice with potential for a large-scale transformation (Clark and
Pinder, 1999). Another striking feature of the Arsenale is that because of its location
within the city and because of its limited access via public transportation, it has remained
outside of the traditional tourist routes.
As mentioned, we restrict attention to two portions of the Arsenale. The first is the
historic part of the Arsenale around the so-called Darsena Grande. This area includes a
basin that can be used as a marina, as well as historic buildings erected over the course of
several centuries. The south of the Darsena Grande houses Tesoni Gotici and the
Corderie, two highly prized buildings owned by the Italian Navy. The Capannone
(Warehouse) lies in the north of the Darsena. This structure was re-built by the Austrian
Government in the 19th century and is currently owned by the Italian national government
and by the municipality of Venice. The west Darsena has a building dating back to the
18th century, known as the Squadratori, owned by the Italian Navy. All of these buildings
are subject to historic conservation restrictions. The Darsena Grande is accessible on foot
directly from the nearby residential district of Castello, and by water, both by private and
public transit boats. It also has docking areas and boat slips. The majority of its buildings
are abandoned, as a result of a slow decline that started after World War II. At present,
only a few buildings are used by the Navy as offices and by the municipality of Venice as
museums or for special temporary exhibits.
The other portion of the Arsenale this study is concerned with is Bacini
(Shipbuilding docks), which is used for shipbuilding and boat repairs, and has several
buildings, but no particular historic value. The Venice Transit Authority houses its
vaporetti (public transit boats) here. The Bacini area cannot be accessed directly by car or
truck, and is far from the train station, but a proposal is currently under consideration that
would connect it directly to the airport via an underground rail system. Because it is
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relatively large, this area could be reused for shipbuilding purposes, but also for housing,
hotels, recreational structures, laboratories and offices. The City would allow buildings
without special historic status to be demolished and rebuilt with a different layout.
In contrast with the other two locations, the S. Marta Waterfront can be accessed
directly by car and truck, is close to the train station, is easily reached by water, and is
served by the public transportation system. There are several abandoned buildings and
facilities in this area, including warehouses, the old gasometers and related facilities, and
former manufacturing plants. Observers as well as city officials concur that this area is
suitable for offices, university buildings, sports and recreational facilities, port authority
and small manufacturing plants, and housing.

3. Research Questions and Previous Literature
This paper focuses on three major research questions. The first is whether historic
building or area designations attract or deter real estate investors, which leads to the
natural question whether these properties may be made more appealing to developers by
relaxing development/conservation restrictions (or, conversely, by offering “enhanced”
historic designation). The second is whether traditional economic incentives for economic
development can be deployed successfully with areas or buildings of historic values, and
if they can be combined or traded off with historic building conservation requirements.
The third is whether we can identify specific groups of developers to whom the regulatory
relief tools and incentives are especially appealing, so that local governments can target
them.
The research questions of this paper are tied with three major strands of the
literature. The first is the empirical literature that has examined the effects of historic
building or district designations. Asabere and Huffman (1991) argue that since zoning
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and historical district requirements are associated with restrictions on development rights,
those parties that invest in certified historical structures are accepting a “substantial
degree of functionality and physical disutility,” which in turn increases business risk. This
disincentive should be reflected in property values, and is likely to be even stronger for
non-residential properties. Their empirical analysis shows that vacant properties in the
historical district of Philadelphia in the late 1980s did sell for higher prices, all else the
same, than properties outside of the historical district, suggesting that at this locale the
positive externality effects of historical districting—which is a form of zoning—
outweighed the negative effects of restrictions on development.
Cyrenne et al. (2006) ask a similar question for Winnipeg, Manitoba, but use
assessed values instead of sale prices, individual historic buildings instead of vacant
parcels, and a panel dataset, which allows them to control for unobserved neighborhood
characteristics potentially correlated with property values. They compare buildings that
qualify for (i) a downtown historical building tax credit and (ii) a city-wide heritage
building tax credit program with “control” buildings that do not meet historic
designations but are located in the same area as the qualifying buildings. Cyrenne et al.
find evidence of a negative externality from being located close to historic buildings.
Moreover, they find that rehabilitation expenditures increase the value of buildings, but
that they are not fully capitalized—the marginal effect of renovation expenditures is
$0.33 for every dollar of expenditure.
Noonan (2007) uses transactions of attached homes in Chicago to examine the
effects of landmarks and historical districts on residential property values. Noonan is
particularly concerned about correlated but omitted factors that explain property prices.
To avoid falsely attributing to landmarks and historical districts effects on property prices
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that are truly due to these omitted factors, he deploys the repeat-sale approach and treats
the error terms in his regression equation as spatially correlated.
The second strand of the literature relevant to this paper is the extensive and rather
controversial empirical literature about the effectiveness of local economic development
incentives. Such incentives typically include industrial development bonds, tax credits for
job creation or business location, property tax abatement, tax increment financing, and
downtown development authorities.
Recent studies suggest a statistically significant, positive relationship between tax
incentives and regional and local growth and property values (Bartik, 1991; Greenstone
and Moretti, 2003; Newman and Sullivan, 1988; Wasylenko, 1997), but researchers
dispute the magnitude of the impacts of incentives on overall economic gains in targeted
areas (Fisher and Peters, 1998; Fox and Murray, 2004; Peters and Fisher, 2002).
Research in this area is afflicted by the problem that concurrent incentives at the
same locale make it very difficult to disentangle the effect of each individual incentive, a
problem that can be remedied only by deploying very careful quasi-experimental
approaches with control and treatment groups (Bartik, 2004; Greenstone and Moretti,
2003).2 In general, it remains difficult to ascertain whether incentives were effective or
business locations and/or area redevelopment would have taken place even in their
absence (Peters and Fisher, 2004).
Finally, we wish to emphasize that we are interested in the reuse of historical
buildings or complexes of buildings, and that this can be broadly interpreted as an
example of infill redevelopment. We are not aware of previous empirical work that has
assessed the effectiveness of economic incentives and policies aimed at stimulating the
reuse of abandoned/underutilized sites of historical and artistic significance. To our
2

See Meyer (1996) for a lucid presentation of experimental and quasi-experimental approaches in
econometrics.
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knowledge, earlier research has usually focused on situations where infill redevelopment
is complicated by the actual or suspected presence of contamination, which triggers
liability and increases the costs and riskiness of projects because of the necessary
environmental inquiries and remediation (McGrath, 2000). Much attention has been
devoted as of late to the so-called “brownfields”— abandoned or underutilized sites
without with suspected or confirmed contamination problems.
Economic inducements and regulatory and liability relief have indeed been
advocated as potentially effective for stimulating cleanup and redevelopment of
brownfields (Bartsch et al., 1996; DeSousa, 2004; Howland, 2000, 2004; Yount and
Meyer, 1999). The empirical literature assessing the effectiveness of these instruments is
limited and the evidence is mixed. Liability relief, for example, attracts participation in
voluntary cleanup programs, but does not necessarily result in much remediation activity
(Alberini, 2007) nor in improved property transaction rates (Sementelli and Simons,
1997).
On their part, real estate developers claim that they are responsive to a broad
range of inducements.

In surveys in Europe (Alberini et al., 2005) and in the US

(Wernstedt et al., 2006) choice experiments suggest that developers can be attracted to
contaminated sites by offering them subsidies, liability relief, and less stringent
regulation. Prior experience with projects at contaminated sites matters, in the sense that
these incentives do not appeal to the same extent to all developers.
It remains to be seen, however, whether similar incentives will work with
abandoned or underutilized of historical, artistic and architectural significance, and
whether the latter are subject to similar reservations. These are precisely the issues that
we explore in this paper using conjoint choice experiments.
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4. Conjoint Choice Experiments and Econometric Models of the Responses
In this section, we first describe conjoint choice experiments and then provide
details on the design and structure of the conjoint choice experiment questions in our
study.

A. Conjoint Choice Experiments
Conjoint choice experiments are a survey-based technique used to investigate the
tradeoffs that people are prepared to make between different goods or policies. This
technique can be used to find the monetary value that people ascribe to goods or to the
benefits of a policy, as long as one of the attributes is the “price” of the good or the cost
of the policy to the respondent. It is a stated-preference technique, in that it relies on what
individuals say they would do under hypothetical circumstances, rather than observing
actual behaviors in marketplaces.
In a typical conjoint choice experiment survey, respondent are shown alternative
variants of a good described by a set of attributes, and are asked to choose their most
preferred (Hanley et al., 2001). The alternatives differ from one another in the levels
taken by two or more of the attributes.
One advantage of conjoint choice experiments—and of stated-preference methods
in general—is that they allow the analyst to study people’s responsiveness to goods,
levels of environmental quality, or policy offering that do not currently exist. Another
major advantage is that the attributes can be manipulated independently of one another,
allowing the analyst to disentangle their effects separately. This is a great advantage when
in real life attributes tend to be bundled together. For example, at many locales historic
building or district designations imply both tax credits or other subsidies (a plus), and
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conservation and use restrictions (a minus). Conjoint choice experiments are also a very
flexible technique, in that it can be adapted to a variety of policies and situations.

B. Our Conjoint Choice Experiments
In our conjoint choice experiments, the alternatives were hypothetical real estate
development projects at four possible locations in Venice: (i) the Waterfront in the S.
Marta neighborhood, (ii) Arsenale Darsena Grande, the middle portion of the Arsenale,
the historic shipbuilding, (iii) Arsenale Bacini, the northeastern part of the Arsenale,
which is currently used for shipbuilding, and (iv) a “generic” real estate investment
project elsewhere. The alternative projects were described by four more attributes, in
addition to the location: (i) access (at the current level or improved), (ii) allowed use
(commercial or light industrial with an emphasis on artisanal/handicraft activities), (iii)
building preservation restrictions (required or not required), (iv) property regime (full
private property or lease), and (v) price per square meter.
Attributes and levels of the attributes are summarized in table 1. We arrived at this
list of attributes after consulting with local public officials and a small number of real
estate developers and real estate agents specializing in the commercial sector. Regarding
use, the City Master Plan and much of the debate in City circles have focused on
commercial and light industrial uses for these locations. Light industrial use, in particular,
is argued to fulfil the goal of protecting traditional handcrafting and boat building
activities.
It should be emphasized that attributes (ii), (iii) and (iv) could be altered through
changes in the City’s policy or through negotiations with developers on an individual
basis (see Stellin and Zoboli, 2006). The City could also offer tax credits or other
subsidies to developers in order to encourage reuse of the three abandoned or underused
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areas studied here, in which case such offerings would be captured into attribute (v)—
price per square meter.
A series of sample conjoint choice questions is reproduced in the Appendix. As
shown in Figure A.1, we first asked respondents to choose between hypothetical projects
A and B, each entailing a transformation of one of the three areas in Venice. This
question was followed by another binary choice question that asked respondents which
they would prefer—the project they had just chosen in the previous exercise, which is in
Venice, or a typical project for their firm to be undertaken elsewhere? This latter choice
task is shown in Figure A.2.
Each respondent was shown a total of 4 project A-project B pairs (both in
Venice), plus 4 questions where the respondent was asked to choose between the Venice
project just selected and a project elsewhere, for a total of 8 conjoint choice questions.

Table 1. Attributes and attribute levels in the conjoint choice experiments.
Attribute
Location

Land use
Access
Building Conservation as per Regulations
Property rights
Cost per square meter (in euro)

Levels of the attribute
S. Marta
Arsenale Darsena Grande (Marina)
Arsenale Bacini (Shipbuilding Yard)
Commercial
Light Industrial
Current
Improved
Required
Not required
Full property
Lease
400, 800, 1500, 2500, 4000

C. Econometric Model
The statistical analysis of the responses to conjoint choice questions relies on the
random utility model (RUM) (see Alberini et al., 2007). In this paper, we assume that
respondent i’s indirect utility (or a rescaled measure of profit) from alternative j is
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(1)

Vij = x ij β1 + C ij ⋅ β 2 + ε ij ,

where C ij is the price of the property (expressed in euro per square meter), x is the vector
of the other attributes of the alternatives, and ε ij is an error term that captures individualand alternative-specific factors that influence utility (or rescaled profits), but are not
observable to the researcher.
We assume that when faced with two hypothetical projects, respondents choose
the alternative in the choice set that gives them the higher utility or profits. To derive the
statistical model of the responses, we begin by considering the response to the first pair of
alternatives examined by the respondent. Denote these two alternatives as A and B. By
design, both A and B are Venice projects. Because the size of the choice set is 2, and this
is a “forced choice” question (i.e., the respondent must choose one of these two projects),
we must develop an expression for the probability of a binary outcome.
If the error terms ε are i.i.d. draws from a normal distribution such that

Δε i = ε iB − ε iA is a standard normal, the probability that a respondent chooses alternative
A over alternative B is:
(2)

Pr(i chooses A) = Pr(Δε i < Δx i β1 + ΔC i ⋅ β 2 ) = Φ (Δw i β) ,

⎡ Δx ⎤
⎡β ⎤
where Δx i = x iA − x iB , ΔC i = C iA − C iB , Δw i = ⎢ i ⎥ , β is equal to ⎢ 1 ⎥ , and Φ (⋅) is
⎣β 2 ⎦
⎣ΔCi ⎦
the standard normal cdf.
Suppose that the respondent indicates that he prefers A over B. He is then asked
which he would judge more attractive—A, or another project elsewhere (at a location
other than Venice). Because one of the two alternatives being compared in this latter
question—namely, A—depends on the response to the previous choice question, it can be
shown that the appropriate contribution to the likelihood is that of a panel-data probit with
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length of the panel equal to 2 (Cameron and Quiggin, 1994). To illustrate, the probability
that the respondent chooses A between A and B, and A again between A and a project
elsewhere is:
Pr( A, A) = Φ (Δw i1β, Δw i 2 β, ρ ) ,

(3)

where Δw i1 is the vector of differences between the attributes of alternatives A and B,

Δw i 2 is the vector of differences between the attributes of A and those of the project at
another location altogether, and Φ ( z1 , z 2 , ρ ) is the bivariate standard normal cdf with
arguments z1 and z 2 and correlation coefficient ρ.
When we pool the responses to all conjoint choice questions, the likelihood
function is:
n

4

L = ∏∏ [P1im ] 1im [P2im ] 2 im [P3im ] 3im [P4im ] 4 im ,

(4)

I

I

I

I

i =1 m =1

where m=1, …, 4 denotes the pair of Venice-based alternatives, P1im is the probability
that the respondent exhibited the sequence (A,A) with pair m (see equation (3)), P2im is
the probability of observing sequence (A,O) for pair m (where O=project at Other
location), P3im is the probability of observing sequence (B,B) for pair m, and, finally, P4im
is the probability of observing sequence (B,O) for pair m. The dummies I1im, I2im, I3im and
I4im denote the indicated sequences of responses.3
Implicit in equation (4) is the assumption that the error terms ε are independent
across pairs of projects in Venice within the same respondent. They are also assumed to
be independent across respondents. Coefficients β are estimated using the method of
Maximum Likelihood.

D. Regressors
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Vector x includes two Venice location dummies, namely SMARTA and
ARSGRANDE. It also includes ACCESSO, a dummy denoting whether access to the site
is improved over the current level, and USO, a dummy taking on value of one if the site is
slated for commercial uses and zero if the site is slated for light industrial/artisanal uses.
Also included in x are RESTAURO, a dummy taking on a value of one if building
conservation restrictions apply at the site, and zero otherwise, and PROPRIETA, a
dummy taking on a value of one if development can take place only under a lease from
the government (which is the owner of the three Venice sites studied in the questionnaire
and in this paper), and zero if a regular private property regime is envisioned.
In sum, all binary attributes are coded as 0/1 binary variables, while the price per
square meter is entered in the model as a continuous variable. We represent the
“investment elsewhere” project by using an alternative-specific dummy and by coding all
attributes corresponding to this alternative to zero. Our basic specification of the probit
model of the responses (4) includes all of these regressors. We also estimate additional
specifications where some of these attributes are interacted with characteristics of the
respondent’s firm and of its typical projects.

5. Structure of the Questionnaire and Survey Administration
Our survey questionnaire is self-administered by the respondents using standalone computers or on-line, and is divided into 4 sections.
In section 1, we ask the respondent to describe the nature of his or her company’s
business. Is it a real estate development company, a real estate investment firm or bank, a
lender, or a consulting outfit that works primarily for developers? If the respondent’s
company has done development projects in the last five years, we ask him or her to

3

An (A,A) sequence would therefore result in the following values for these four dummies: (1, 0, 0, 0).
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describe three of them to us: Where did each take place? Was it a residential, industrial,
or commercial project? Was it an office building? Did the company sell it, lease it to
tenants, or does it manage it directly? And what was the volume built?
Next, we ask the respondent to tell us if his company does residential, commercial,
or industrial projects, or office buildings, and what percent of all projects are accounted
for each of these types. We recognize that pinpointing exact percentages might be
difficult, so we provide ranges (0-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, or 81-100%) to
facilitate the respondent’s task. We also inquire which markets the respondent’s company
usually does these projects in—is it the Veneto (the Region in Italy whose capital city is
Venice4)? Northern Italy? The rest of Italy? Abroad?
This section ends with questions about development projects and decisions. We
show respondents a list of factors surrounding real estate deals and investments, and ask
them to tell us if each of these factors is “always,” “almost always,” “often,”
“sometimes” or “never” crucial in their investment decisions. These factors include the
possibility of negotiating with local authorities, zoning and building conservation
constraints, limits on the time needed for permits, and many others.
In the last screen of section 1, we ask respondents what they usually look for when
making investment decisions: New buildings in turn-key conditions? Existing buildings
that need some restructuring? Parcels without buildings? Derelict sites that must be
regenerated?

Section 2 of the questionnaire is about Venice. We first wish to find out whether
the respondent’s company has ever done any real estate development in Venice proper or
the Venice hinterland, and, if so, what type of projects. Then, we wish to find out whether
the respondent would ever consider Venice and the Venice hinterland for development
4

We remind the reader than in Italy, the Region is a jurisdiction (not a mere geographical area) with powers
and authority similar to those of a State in the US and a Province in Canada.
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projects. If the answer is “yes,” respondents are to pinpoint the reasons why they find
Venice attractive for business out of a list of possibilities. If the answer is “no,” we show
them a list of possible disadvantages of Venice as a location for business, and ask them to
indicate which ones apply to them.
The purpose of asking these questions is two-fold. First, it is of independent
interest to find out what makes Venice attractive or unattractive to developers. Second, by
making respondents focus on the pros and the cons of doing business in Venice, these
questions serve as a useful “bridge” towards section 3 of the questionnaire—the conjoint
choice questions.
The conjoint choice questions (see section 3 of this paper for a discussion of the
attributes, and Figures A.1 and A.2 for examples) are preceded by a brief description of
the S. Marta and the two Arsenale developable areas. Respondents wishing to obtain
fuller descriptions of these areas are offered the option to do so by launching hyperlinks
on the screen (see Figure A.3 in the Appendix).
The fourth and last section of the questionnaire asks general questions about the
annual revenue of the company, its headquarters, whether the company is partly owned or
controlled by a government entity, and the position held by the respondent within the
company.
Ideally, we would have liked to administer the questionnaire to a sample
representative of the universe of developers based in Italy and in other European
countries. We had a list of developers that do business in the Milan area and in the
Veneto, and we contacted these firms by e-mail and over the telephone, asking them to
complete our questionnaire on-line. This approach resulted in a total of 38 completed
questionnaires. After several solicitations, three “recalcitrant” developers finally agreed to
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meet with one of our interviewers in their offices and filled out the questionnaire using a
laptop computer.
Since our list cannot be considered exhaustive, and at any rate we had only been
able to gather a total 41 completed questionnaires in this way, we expanded our sample
by going to professional real estate developer meetings and trade fairs, where we asked
attendees to participate in the survey on the spot. We were able to obtain 60 completed
questionnaires at the MIPIM trade fair in Cannes, France, in March 2006 and 45 more
questionnaires at the REAG in Milan, Italy, in May 2006. (The UrbanPromo conference
in November 2005 in Venice, Italy, served as the testing grounds for an earlier draft of the
questionnaire, which was administered to a total of 10 attendees.)

6. The Data

A. Characteristics of the Respondents and of their Investment Projects
Our first order of business is to examine the characteristics of the respondents, the
companies they represent, and the development projects that their companies undertake.
As shown in table 2, developers account for over one-half of our sample (51.77%), and
the second most heavily represented category is consultants or advisors to real estate
developers or investors (22%). Lenders, construction companies, and real estate
investment firms account each for 7% of the sample.

Table 2. Type of firm or company (N=141)
TIPOIMP
Developer
Construction company
Lender providing financing to firms
Real estate investment
Loans and savings
Consultant/advisor
Other

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper219

PERCENT OF THE SAMPLE
51.77
7.09
7.80
7.80
1.42
21.99
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Regarding the headquarters of the company, 87.23% are based in Italy and
12.77% in other countries. Only 5.84% of the respondents reported that their firm was
partially owned or controlled by a government entity. Figure 1 displays information about
the distribution of annual revenue, showing that companies with annual revenue greater
than €10 million account for over two-thirds of the sample, and that for about 36% of the
companies in the sample the annual revenue is above €50 million.
What type of projects do our respondents’ companies do? About 85.5% of the
companies do office buildings, 89.9% do shopping malls and commercial projects, 41%
do projects entailing industrial land uses, and 69% do residential projects. A vast majority
of these projects (85-90%, depending on the type) take place in Italy. Table 3 shows the
degree of diversification of operations of each firm: Only for less than 10% of the sample
does a specific type of projects account for the lion’s share (81-100%) of all projects.

Figure 1.

Percent of the sample

Size of the company (annual revenue)
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

36.11
30.56

8.33

10.19

12.04

2.78
< 500.000 500K – 1 1 – 5 mill.
mill.

5 – 10
mill.

10 – 50
mill.

> 50 mill.

Annual revenue (euro)
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Table 3. Type of projects as share of total projects.
percent of all projects
0-20
21-40
41-60
61-80

office
buildings
25.64
38.46
18.8
11.97

81-100

5.13

percent of the sample
commercial industrial

N=117

residential

36.89
42.62
9.84
3.28

40.35
31.58
10.53
10.53

22.92
28.13
22.92
16.67

7.38

7.02

9.38

N=122

N=57

N=96

Table 4 summarizes the respondents’ views of crucial aspects of development
decisions. Opportunities for agreements with local governments (item 1) are “always” or
“almost always” crucial for over two-thirds of the sample, as are warranties and
reassurances on the time needed to get permits (item 3). The possibility of purchasing the
property (item 4)—as opposed to leasing it—is also important, as are the prestige of the
location (item 11), and, of course, the cost of the property (item 12) and construction
costs (item 13).
Regarding the duration of the lease (item 5), the possibility of subdividing the
development project or building (item 6), the presence of land use and historicarchitectural conservation restrictions (item 7), environmental impact assessment
requirements (item 8), and proximity to transportation nodes and network (items 9-10),
respondents were more evenly distributed among the various response categories.
As shown in table 5, 26 respondents (18.31% of the sample) have previously done
real estate development in Venice and 26 have done projects in the Venice hinterland.
Specifically, 15 respondents has done projects in Venice proper but not in the hinterland,
15 reports having done projects in the Venice mainland but not in the city of Venice, and
11 have done projects at both locations.
When asked whether they would consider Venice as a possible location for
business, 74% and 63% of the respondents indicated that they would, for the city of
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Venice and its hinterland, respectively. What’s even more astounding is that only 22
respondents (15% of the sample) said that they would not consider either location.

Table 4. When making investment decisions, which of the factors listed below is crucial?
Percentage of respondents who selected the indicated category. (N=142)
Always
1. Agreements with
local authorities
2. Tax exemptions
3. Guarantees on the
terms necessary for
authorizations and
permits
4. Full property
5. Duration of the
lease (if leased)
6. Possibility of
subdividing the
property
7. Zoning and building
conservation
restrictions
8. Required
Environmental Impact
Assessment
9. Closeness to a
highway
10. Closeness to an
airport
11. Prestige of the
location
12. Price
13. Construction cost

Almost
always

Often

Sometimes

Never

44.37
11.27

23.24
12.68

14.79
16.9

12.68
35.92

4.93
23.24

35.92
52.82

30.28
20.42

20.42
15.49

8.45
7.04

4.93
4.23

32.39

16.9

11.97

16.2

22.54

22.54

23.94

27.46

22.54

3.52

35.92

21.83

17.61

19.72

4.93

19.72

17.61

17.61

26.06

19.01

17.61

16.9

26.06

32.39

7.04

11.97

12.68

21.83

36.62

16.9

48.59
66.2
69.72

27.46
18.31
17.61

16.9
9.86
5.63

6.34
4.93
5.63

0.7
0.7
1.41

Table 5. Actual and potential interest in Venice as project/investment locale. N=142.
Have you ever
done a
project/investment
in…?
Venice the Venice
hinterland
No
Yes

81.69
18.31

81.69
18.31
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26.06
73.94
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C. Responses to the Conjoint Choice Questions
Table 6 reports the relative frequency of the various response categories for the
conjoint choice questions. In choice questions 2, 3, and 4, the percentage of “project A”
and “project B” responses is generally well-balanced, suggesting that there were no
obviously superior alternatives. Only in choice question 1, almost two-thirds of the
respondents selected project A. Comparison between the responses to questions 1-4 and
those to questions 1a-4a suggests that when pressed to indicate which they would
prefer—the previously selected project in Venice or a project elsewhere—almost 50% of
the respondents announced that they would still choose the Venice project and a little
over 50% would take the project at another location.

Table 6. Frequency of the responses to the conjoint choice questions.
CHOICE
QUESTION

PERCENT
CHOOSE A

PERCENT
CHOOSE B

PERCENT
CHOOSE “A
PROJECT
ELSEWHERE”*

1
64.08
35.92
1-a
30.99
15.49
53.52
2
50.70
49.30
2-a
26.06
22.54
51.41
3
53.52
46.48
3-a
26.06
17.61
56.34
4
51.41
48.59
4-a
18.31
22.54
59.15
* Choose “another project elsewhere” or confirm the project selected in the immediately preceding
choice question.

7. Econometric Estimation Results
We report the estimation results for model (4) in table 7. Panel (A) reports our
basic specification, which includes only the attributes of the alternatives. Panel (B)
reports the results of a specification that includes interactions between selected attributes
of the alternatives and characteristics of the respondent’s firm (or of its projects).
Panel (A) shows that, all else the same, our respondents consider S. Marta roughly
equally desirable as a generic, non-Venice location for their development projects. The
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Arsenale Darsena Grande location is slightly less preferred, but is judged more desirable
than the Arsenale Bacini location. This makes sense to us: S. Marta is accessible by car,
truck and rail, and is thus, for all practical purposes, perfectly comparable to a nonVenice location. The Arsenale locations are probably too difficult to reach; in the case of
the Bacini, its shipbuilding facilities may be too specialized to appeal to broad group of
developers.
At first, we were surprised that the coefficient of the attribute indicating improved
access was not statistically significant, but we believe that this is due to the fact that
respondents are already indicating a preference for Santa Marta, which is already fully
accessible by car, truck and rail. (We experimented with entering an interaction between
the access attribute and the Arsenale locations, but the coefficient on this interaction term
was small (-0.07) and statistically insignificant (t statistic=-0.46).)
Relaxing the conservation requirements does not make a difference to our
respondents, suggesting that, after all, the presence of such restrictions is neither the deal
maker nor breaker in a city like Venice. By contrast, USO and PROPRIETA have strong
effects on the likelihood of preferring an alternative over another. The coefficients on
these attributes indicate clearly that respondents reject hypothetical projects that are slated
for light industrial or artisanal uses, preferring, all else the same, projects slated for
commercial use. They also shun government leases, preferring the full private property.
The coefficient on price per square meter is negative and significant, as expected.
This suggests that developers will probably respond to financial incentives, as long as
these can readily be translated into net land prices.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the coefficients, suppose a real estate developer
were to choose between two projects at Santa Marta. Both imply full property and a price
per square meter of €1500. Santa Marta project A is slated for commercial use, while
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Santa Marta project B is slated for light industrial/handicraft production use. Model (A)
predicts that the probability that A is preferred is 0.6932. It would take a large increase in
the price of A (to €4000) and a dramatic discount on the price per square meter of B (to
€400) to make the two projects at this locale closer to one another in terms of desirability:
Changing the prices in this way reduces the probability of still choosing A to 0.5336 and
brings the probability of choosing B to 0.4664.
If the City further decided that project A can be offered only with a lease, instead
of fully transferring the property to the developer, the probability that the developer
chooses A would fall to 0.4029, while that of preferring B would rise to 0.5971. Santa
Marta project A would now be less preferred than a commercial project at the Arsenale
Grande with full property and the same price per square foot (€4000) (the probabilities
being 0.40 and 0.60, respectively).
A commercial project at Santa Marta with full property remains less preferred than
a project at any other non-Venice location when the price per square meter is €1500 per
square meter or higher, but would become more preferred at lower land prices. For
example, if the price per square meter at Santa Marta were €400, the probability of
choosing the Santa Marta location would be 54% (versus 46% for the “other” location),
and if it was €800, the probability of choosing Santa Marta would be 52%.
Panel (B) of table 7 shows that the attractiveness of non-Venice locations for
development project do vary across company types. Respondents who describe their
company as a real estate development firm are more averse to Venice locations than
others. We attribute this result to the reputation of the local administration and the
complex political reality in the City, which is judged as relatively unfriendly by
developers, a business-minded group that seeks a fast turnaround for its investments.
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The magnitude of the coefficient on the term [alternative-specific intercept] ×[
80% or more industrial projects] indicates that respondents from companies that do
primarily industrial projects almost always choose the non-Venice location when asked
between a non-Venice project and a Venice project. Clearly, this is confirming the
unattractiveness of Venice locations for industrial uses.
By contrast, those companies that do primarily commercial projects seem to find
Venice an attractive market, probably because of the residents’ and tourists’ demand for
retail and wholesale shopping and a lack of supermarkets in Venice. This is our
interpretation for the negative and significant coefficient on [an alternative-specific
intercept] ×[80% or more commercial projects].
We also checked whether those respondents who judge zoning and conservation
restrictions as always important can be appealed to by relaxing conservation restrictions
in Venice. The coefficient on the interaction between this attribute and a dummy
capturing those respondents has the expected sign (negative) but is statistically
insignificant, as is the coefficient on the interaction between the dummy capturing these
respondents and the “investment elsewhere” alternative-specific intercept. The latter
coefficient is positive, suggesting that there is weak evidence that these persons would
prefer locales that are less likely to have conservation restrictions in place.
Finally, respondents for whom the full property regime is always important are
more deterred from leases than the other respondents. This effect—which can be inferred
from the coefficient on the term [full property] × [full property “always” crucial in project
decisions]—approaches, but does quite make, the 10% significance level.
The last term we entered in the model was an interaction between the alternativespecific intercept and a dummy denoting whether the respondent always regards
agreements with local governments as a crucial factor in making investment decisions.
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We decided to enter this variable in the model because several respondents in the course
of the survey literally blurted out that they considered the city of Venice unreliable and
unwilling to cooperate with developers and real estate investors. The coefficient on this
variable is positive—which would seem to confirm the notion that companies who give
high priority to agreements with local government when making investment decisions
tend to prefer locales other than Venice—but very small and statistically insignificant.

Table 7. Probit model results.
(A) Basic specification

(B) Specification with
interactions

coefficient

t statistic

coefficient

0.234018

2.56

0.238216

2.58

0.15686

1.95

0.145699

1.79

0.093533

1.22

0.081505

1.06

Conservation restrictions

-0.00414

-0.06

0.042835

0.48

Use

0.505225

7.29

0.510783

7.26

Full property

-0.33029

-4.79

-0.21941

-2.37

Price per square meter

-0.00012

-4.41

-0.00013

-4.67

Alternative-specific intercept*

0.264073

2.43

0.065323

0.45

Alternative-specific intercept × Developer

0.262789

2.23

Alternative-specific intercept ×( mostly industrial)
Alternative-specific intercept × (mostly
commercial)
Alternative-specific intercept × (building
company)
Alternative-specific intercept × (zoning and
historic conservation restrictions always
important)
Conservation restrictions × (zoning and historic
conservation restrictions always important)

1.386414

2.67

-0.496

-2.09

-0.10151

-0.45

0.105624

0.75

-0.14595

-0.98

Full property × (full property always important)
Alternative-specific intercept × (agreements with
local governments always important)

-0.19927

-1.62

0.049472

0.41

Variable
Santa Marta
Arsenale Darsena Grande
Access

Nobs
Number responses
log likelihood
Rho
LR test Rho=0
p value LR test
* Investment at another, non-Venice location.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper219

1136

1136

568

568

-728.97

-713.77

0.072386

t statistic

0.98

.07032

0.96

0.86

0.163

0.176

.93
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8. Discussion and Conclusions.
We have used conjoint choice questions to explore the preferences of real estate
developers and investors for projects in Venice involving the reuse of abandoned or
underused areas that have historical, artistic and architectural value.
The results of our models raise doubts about the concerns sometimes expressed by
city officials and observers, who fear that conservation restrictions may have a deterrent
effect on non-local investors. We find that the presence of conservation restrictions is not
a deterrent to investment and redevelopment projects at the locations with historical and
architectural value in Venice. Conversely, relaxing existing conservation restrictions does
not have any effect on the attractiveness of the locations we focused on. We checked
with real estate agents that specialize in the commercial sector in Venice, and they told us
that developers take it for granted that construction in Venice must follow prescribed
conservation regulations. Indeed, the market itself demands buildings that comply with
such conservation requirements (Rosato et al., 2006).
By contrast, our respondents tended to avoid alternatives slated for light industrial
use, and wanted the full property, rather than a lease from the government. These results
are consistent with the opinions about the importance of certain aspects of an investment
project reported by the respondent in another section of the questionnaire. They also point
out to the need for the City to be in tune with developer demand for specific types of land
uses. In that sense, our findings sound a common theme with Howland (2004), who warn
that obsolete zoning, land use, and infrastructure may hinder development more than
other factors (environmental contamination in her study, historic preservation
requirements in ours). That historic buildings at locales outside of Venice in reasonable
shape but subject to very specific zoning and use restrictions have remained unsold at a
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recent auction (Unknown Author, 20065) seems to confirm this point. Based on these
findings, we would recommend flexibility in the land use and property regime options to
be offered by City officials to individual developers.
We find it encouraging—both from the point of view of consistency with
economic theory and that of policy—that respondents do respond to the price of acquiring
and redeveloping the land. This means that it might be possible to encourage them to
undertake projects in Venice by offering them appropriate financial incentive packages.
In the end, it is difficult to say if our findings can be extrapolated to other “cities
of art” or the historical districts of cities in Europe and in the US, given the uniqueness of
Venice. Our approach, however, should be relatively straightforward to adopt at other
locales where conservation restrictions are perceived as a hindrance to urban
revitalization and reuse of existing structure, and where well-guided public policies are
needed to offset them.

5

This piece of news appeared in The Gazzettino, the local Venice and Veneto newspaper.
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Appendix.
Figure A.1: Example of Choice between two Venice alternatives
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Figure A.2: Example of Choice between a Venice and a non-Venice alternative
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Figure A.3: Description of Venice investment sites: S. Marta
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